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KEITZ v. NATIONAL PAVING CO.
injured by a deleterious substance in a drink will still have
to base his suit on negligence and not on implied warranty.
On the other hand, it could be argued that beverages for
human consumption are just as much food as are solids, and
this would seem to be the more reasonable interpretation.
There is some doubt as to what effect the new pro-
vision will make in the practical application of the rule.
Whether or not the new law will give rise to a series of
nuisance claims remains to be seen. In any event, it seems
sound to give relief to one injured in a restaurant on the
same grounds as if food were taken out. The difficulty,
even impossibility, of proving negligence in many cases
can result in injustice.
ALLAN B. BLUMBERG
The Borrowed Servant
Keitz v. National Paving and Contracting Company'
Lloyd Ogle was driving a dump truck on Pimlico Road
when he negligently drove across the center line and struck
a bus, seriously injuring the driver. A suit was instituted
against the servant Ogle, and against Elizabeth May Sud-
brook and The National Paving Company, who were, re-
spectively, his general and special employers.2 The lower
court directed a verdict in favor of the special employer,
and the jury found against the other two defendants. The
plaintiff appealed, seeking to hold the special employer also.
The Court of Appeals awarded plaintiff a new trial against
National. In deciding that the jury could reasonably find
that National had such a relationship to Ogle's acts that it,
as well as Sudbrook, could be held liable, the Court pointed
out that it is essential that a master who is to be held have
the right to control, but not that he actually exercise it.
Under the usual test, when the servant causes injury
by doing an act in a negligent manner, that master is held
1214 Md. 479, 134 A. 2d 296 (1957). Reargued on different points, 214
Md. 496, 136 A. 2d 299.
2The general employer is that individual with whom the servant is
regularly employed and who was the master before the servant was bor-
rowed or hired and who will continue as such after the service to the
special employer has terminated. The special employer is that individual
who has borrowed or hired the servant from the general employer. There
is generally a contractual relationship between the general and special em-
ployers under which the servant is lent or hired to the special employer.
For an illustration of this definition see: M.EHF , AGENoY (4th ed.
1952) §453.
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who had the predominant right to control the manner in
which the act was done. This right is ordinarily held to
remain with the general employer unless the facts show
otherwise.' In the subject case, National instructed Ogle
to proceed out Pimlico Road and pick up a load of filler
dust, but did National have the right to control the manner
in which the truck was driven?
In two similar cases the Maryland Court seems to have
thought that the right to control had not shifted to the
special employer. In the recent Maryland case of Baltimore
Transit Co. v. State," the jury was held to have properly
found that the responsibility for the servant's negligence
did not shift from the general employer, even though the
rental of her trucks was over a long period of time and the
special employer gave instructions to the drivers as to safe
and careful driving." The Maryland Court in Bentley,
Shriver & Co. v. Edwards, a case involving the applica-
tion of the fellow servant rule rather than the master's tort
liability to a third person, held that when the special em-
ployer could tell the driver where and when to go, but
could not direct the manner in which he drove, the special
employer was not the master. That case was similar to the
subject case, in that the general employer hired out his
truck and servant to carry goods at the direction of the
special employer.
Although these two cases seem to be in conflict with
the decision reached in the subject case, it should be in-
dicated that in cases of this nature no one factor is con-
trolling.7 Control may be based on the right of hire and
8 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Maryland Annotations (1936) 127-130; 5 Br.AsH-
FIErD, CYCLoPniA oF AuToMOMLE LAW AND PRACTICE (Perm. ed. 1954)
§§2981, 2984. For a definition of the manner of control doctrine see W. S.
Quinby Co. v. Estey, 221 Mass. 56, 108 N. E. 908 (1915), where the court
said:
"When a servant or agent in the general employ of one person is sent
to work for another, he does not become the servant of the one to whom
he is sent merely because the latter directs what work is to be done, or
in what way it s to be done. The original master remains liable and
the employee remains his agent, unless the authority to direct and
control the servant in all the details of the transaction is surrendered
to some other person, so that the business in which the servant is
engaged is no longer the business of his general employer, but is in
all respects the business of the person to whom he is sent. If the ser-
vant remains subject to the general orders of the man who hires and
pays him he is still his Servant, although specific directions may be
given him by another person, from time to time as to the details of the
work and the manner of doing it."
'184 Md. 250, 40 A. 2d 678 (1945).
Ibid., 264.
100 Md. 652, 60A. 283 (1906).
'1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §220.
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discharge.8 Cases have also turned on the question of
ownership of the vehicle, on the theory that an owner of
an expensive machine is more likely to be interested in
keeping it out of the hands of an incompetent or careless
operator." These factors would tend to support a finding
that liability remained in Sudbrook. It was she who owned
the trucks, paid the drivers, had the right to hire and fire
them and insured and cared for the trucks. Some of the
facts, on the other hand, point to a shift in control; the
rental to National was over a long period; 10 Ogle worked
side by side with National's employees," went where
National sent him and was under some general control by
the special employer. Also, the fact that the name of the
special employer appeared on the side of the truck might
be held to raise a weak presumption of a master-servant
relationship with the National Company."
The Restatement of Agency discussed the following con-
siderations, among others, to be weighed in determining
whether liability has shifted:
1. "If the servant is expected only to give results
called for by the temporary employer [hauling the
filler dust from one point to another] and to use the
instrumentality as the servant would expect his gen-
eral employer would desire, the original service con-
tinues."
2. "[T]he fact that the general employer is in the busi-
ness of renting machines and men is relevant, since
in such a case there is more likely to be an intent to
retain control over the instrumentality."18
Other factors have also been given importance."
056 C. J. S., Master and Servant, § §1, 2e, 57 C. J. S. 276, Master and Ser-
vant, §568b; Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1907).
0 The Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215 (1909) ; Thatcher v.
Pierce, 281 Pa. 16, 125 A. 302 (1924). For a note on a similar English case
see: 9 Cam. L. J. 382 (1947).
10 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §220(2) (f).
uH. E. Wolfe Const. Go. v. Fersner, 58 F. 2d 27 (4th Cir. 1932). This
case seemed to turn upon the fact that the lessor's trucks and drivers
operated side by side with the lessee's trucks and held the lessee even
though the lessor had the right to hire and fire his own drivers.
1 Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 339 Mo. 982, 98 S. W. 2d 717 (1936) ; Ashley
v. Safeway Stores, 100 Mont. 312, 47 P. 2d 53 (1935); Constitution Pub.
Co. v. Dale, 164 F. 2d 210 (5th Cir., 1947).
"1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §227, comment c.
2, In previous Maryland cases, a distinction was often made as to loaned
and hired servants and the reports indicate that the courts had a greater
inclination to relieve the general employer where he has loaned his servant,
on the theory that he is not receiving any pecuniary recompense for the
19581
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The Restatement points out that in the absence of an
obvious shift, there is a presumption that the general em-
ployer continues as master.5 Several illustrations are
given which are fairly similar to the subject case but tend
to produce an opposite result:
1. "P, a taxicab company, rents a cab and driver to B
for a day, upon the understanding that the driver
is... to obey all reasonable commands of B. In the
absence of evidence that B is to control the details
as to the management of the cab, A is P's servant
while driving the car."'16
servant's industry. For example, the Court in Salowitch v. Kres, 147 Md.
23, 31, 127 A. 643 (1925) said:
"There is nothing In the cases of Sacker v. Waddell and Sugar Refin-
ing Co. v. Gilbert, which is in conflict with the opinion in the case of
Bentley, Shriver , Go. v. Edwards, 100 Md. 653. In that case the owner
of the automobile truck, Burnmeister, was engaged In the business of
hiring trucks, accompanied by drivers, to various parties who needed
such service. The particular truck was at the time of the accident
being driven by Edwards, the plaintiff in that case, and was engaged
in hauling articles of merchandise for Bentley, Shriver & Co., that
company indicating to the plaintiff what merchandise he was to haul
and where he was to place same. The accident occurred while the
plaintiff was unloading the truck in front of the defendant's place of
business, and was occasioned by the negligence of a general servant
of ,the defendant. It was contended by the defendant that the plaintiff
was a fellow servant of the defendant and therefore could not recover
against the common master. This contention was overruled by this
Court, for the reason that the evidence conclusively showed that when
Edwards was hauling merchandise for the defendant he was engaged
directly In the business of Burnmeister, his general master, and his
acts were in furtherance Of that master's business in furnishing trucks
and drivers for hire. This deci8ion was in accord with the great weight
of authority In respect to the hiring of vehicles and drivers by livery-
stable keepers or garage-men, in which, although the passenger, or one
who hires, has the authority to direct the driver when and where to
drive, it has been practically universally held that the owner Is liable
for an accident occurring during the period for which the vehicle and
driver are used by the passenger. The class of cases represented by
Bentley, Shriver & Co. v. Edwards Is totally different from the present
case, and the principles therein laid down have no application, because
In that case the truck belonged to, and the driver was in the general
employ of a master whose business it was to hire trucks and drivers
to the general public .... ; while here,..., we have a case of a man
loaning, without recompense, a truck and driver.. ." (Italics supplied.)
Other notable "Loaned Servant" cases include: Sacker v. Waddell, 98 Md.
43, 56 A. 399 (1903) ; Sugar Refining Co. v. Gilbert, 145 Md. 251, 125 A. 692
(1924). Notable "Hired Servant" cases: Bentley, Shriver & Co. v. Edwards,
100 Md. 652, 60 A. 283 (1905) ; Hilton Quarries, Inc. v. Hall, 161 Md. 518,
158 A. 19 (1932) ; Baur v. Calic, 166 Md. 387, 171 A. 713 (1934) ; Balto.
Trans. Co. v. State, 184 Md. 250, 40 A. 2d 678 (1945). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the difference between the "Loaned" and "Hired Servant" cases
-compare: 42 A. L. R. 1446 with 42 A. L. R. 1416. See also 17 A. L. R. 2d
1388, which is a review of the, hiring cases in America.
151 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933), §227, comment b.
','Ibid., illus. 1.
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2. "During the loading of P's ship by B, a stevedore, the
steam winch upon the ship operated by A, a member
of the crew, is used to hoist goods from the dock to
the hold. For this service B is to pay P. The servants
of B direct A when to start and when to stop the
winch. The inference is that in the management of
the winch A acts as P's servant.' 7
3. "P, who operates a trucking business, rents to B, an
express company, a truck and driver to deliver goods
and to do such incidental work as the express com-
pany may require in its transportation, for which B
is to pay P at the rate of two dollars an hour. B
specifies that, if available, A, an employee of P, is
to be sent. A is sent. While driving the truck, the
inference is that A remains in P's employment, and
in the absence of further facts A is P's servant dur-
ing such time. If loading and unloading is part of the
service which P agreed to render, A remains in P's
employment, unless B assumes control over the man-
ner of loading and A submits thereto."'"
The only cases in which this section would hold both
the general and special employer would be where the
special employer directs the manner of performance of
the specific act which was the proximate cause of the in-
jury. In the illustration given, 9 the special employer
directed the driver to operate the vehicle at a high rate of
speed, and this resulted in an accident. Thus it would seem
that the result in the subject case is at least a slight de-
parture from the Restatement position. Perhaps the ma-
jority of the jurisdictions and the Restatement 0 would
agree that both employers could be liable in an extraordi-
nary case. Such a possibility has been discussed by
Mechem21 in his work on Agency, but few cases can be
found where the courts have so decided.22 It is possible that
11 Ibid., illus. 4.
28Ibid., illus. 5.
'9Ibid., illus. 8; Malisfski v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 135 F.
2d 910, 914 (4th Cir. 1943).
1 RESTATEMENT, AGEoY (1933) §226.
EMIEEM, AGENCY (4th ed. 1952) §458.
"RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Maryland Annotations (1936) §226; RESTATE-
MENT IN THE CouRTs, AGENCY (Perm. ed. 1945) §226, p. 171; RESTATEMENT
IN THE CoURTs, AGENCY (1954 Supp. Vol. 1) §226, p. 63; op. cit. 8upra, n. 21,
§460; 17 A. L. R. 2d 1388, 1408. This is an excellent annotation which
reviews the hiring cases and lists those which have held the special em-
ployer, which are comparatively few in number. This annotation also super-
sedes 42 A. L. R. 1416 mentioned above in n. 14, supra; 5 BLASHFrIEL
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE (Perm. ed. 1954) §2947.
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in the future, Maryland will adopt the minority view, as
laid down in many Pennsylvania cases,2 3 that both em-
ployers are liable because both have benefited from the ser-
vant's service.
The effect of the decision reached in the subject case is
to hold both masters. From the standpoint of the plaintiff,
this makes it easier for him to collect his judgment. But
it would seem that the injured party is already adequately
protected in that he can hold the servant and at least one
master. Another effect of this decision is to make both
masters contribute to the judgment, thereby lessening the
burden on each. Whether or not this is just depends upon
which doctrine one bases his conclusion. The courts gen-
erally rest their decisions on two theories, both based on
public policy. Under the right to control theory24 it would
seem that in an ordinary situation, only one master would
be held since usually only one would have control over the
specific act which caused injury. Under this theory it
would not seem fair to make that master contribute to the
claim who had no control over the servant as to the specific
act involved. The second theory is based on the doctrine
that since both masters are benefiting from the industry of
the servant, both should be made to pay for his negligence.25
If this theory were adopted, both masters would ordinarily
be held, in the absence of a loan of the servant by one
master to the other. The Maryland Court in the subject
case seems to be verbally adopting the first theory6 and
applying the second. The Court, however, may have felt
that Sudbrook was a mere puppet in supplying trucks to
National in view of the fact that for over a period of years
National accounted for eighty percent of Sudbrook's busi-
ness, as well as the fact that there was no written contract
between the two companies. If this were so, then the right
to control test could be applied to hold National, because
in reality, National would be the sole employer.
R. W. SInPLEy
Loc. cit., supra, n. 21.
MECHM, AGENoY (4th ed. 1952) §460.
Ibid., §458.
U214 Md. 479, 134 A. 2d 296 (1957).
